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SECTION 767 OF THE ILLINOIS
INSURANCE CODE: DOES IT
PRE-EMPT TORT LIABILITY?
J. DOUGLAS DuRHAM*
INTRODUCTION:

AN OVERVIEW

Over the past decade a growing number of jurisdictions
have been faced with suits seeking to impose extra-contractual
liability upon insurers who, in an effort to force a disadvantageous claim settlement upon their insureds, unjustifiably breach
the insurance contract. Reasons for and against imposing such
liability vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Controversy centers on what may be recovered for such conduct, as well as
whether the conduct may itself serve as a basis for tort liability.
Broadly speaking, the insurer's position is that unjustified delay
or denial of benefits constitutes mere breach of contract, and
therefore, the plaintiff's remedy is limited to the contractual obligation of the insurer. The insured takes the position, on the
other hand, that the conduct of the insurer goes beyond mere
breach of contract, constituting a tort independent of the contractual relationship because the injury suffered is palpably
greater than the loss of the insurance benefits. Thus, while the
insurer's conduct constitutes breach of contract, mere contractual damages may prove wholly inadequate to compensate the
insured under the particular circumstances of the case.
Often the environment in which the breach occurs contributes to the extent of the extra-contractual injury and exacerbates the onerous nature of the insurer's conduct. For example,
where the policy involved provides disability or fire insurance
coverage, a "take-what-we-offer-or-nothing" position manifestly
prays on the insured's vulnerability and insecurity, to the insured's disadvantage.
The breach usually occurs when the insured is under considerable stress from the event underlying the claim. The insurer's unjustifiable refusal, actual or threatened, to perform its
contractual obligation is designed to play on and increase that
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pre-existing stress. Such actions place the insured in humiliating and emotional dilemmas. Financial concerns assume inordinate proportions. The insured may have to borrow heavily or
rely on the charity of family members, churches and private organizations. The cost of self-support may be more than the insured can meet without the insurance proceeds and he may be
forced to accept public welfare funds for support and medical
needs.
When physical injuries are severe and a prolonged course of
recovery seems likely, the loss of insurance proceeds, or the acceptance of less than the policy limits, may force the insured or
the insured's family to face the decision of what level of medical
care and rehabilitation the insured will receive. Where the insured requires special therapeutic attention to maximize physical recovery, but such attention cannot be paid for without the
full policy benefits, the insured may suffer permanent physical
impairment due to the lower level of care. Likewise, fire losses
can have far-reaching consequences if not promptly handled.
Families suffer the disruption and inconvenience of prolonged
living in temporary quarters, as well as the financial drain of replacing lost necessities. Businesses still have accounts to pay,
but no cash flow to meet the bills. Depending on the insured's
financial status before the fire and the extent of the fire loss,
bankruptcy is a genuine possibility where an insurer delays.
Under such circumstances, what should the insured be allowed to recover? On what theory should recovery be allowed?
By which theories, if any, should recovery be limited?
In Illinois, recovery depends on the nature of the claim advanced. If the insured is limited to an action on the contract,
punitive damages, as a general rule, are precluded.1 If the insurer's actions, and the resultant injury to the insured, are recognized as a basis for an action in tort, several theories of tort
liability are available. 2 Within this tort area, several new theories of recovery have evolved, and new applications for existing
theories have been found.
The Illinois Supreme Court has yet to directly address tort
liability of an insurer arising from outrageous breach of contract. The five Illinois Appellate Courts have taken markedly
different positions when faced with suits for extra-contractual
1. Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan, 29 I. App. 3d 339, 350, 330 N.E.2d 540,
548 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Ill. 2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.
1972) (liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Robertson v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 100 ImI. App. 3d 845, 427 N.E.2d 302 (1981) (outrageous
conduct); Hoffman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 85 M11.
App. 3d 631, 407 N.E.2d 156
(1980) (liability for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing).
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damages in this context. While some recognize tort liability on
various theories others have refused to recognize such liability,
primarily on the assertion that section 767 of the Illinois Insurance Code pre-empts tort liability. This article will present
those Illinois cases which establish each district's position on
this cause of action. It will then examine the conduct giving rise
to the liability, and the interpretation of section 767 which is the
major obstacle to tort liability in this context.
ILLINOIS CASES

Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan3 presented an Illinois appellate court, in 1975, with its first opportunity to address the existence of a cause of action sounding in tort arising from conduct
constituting breach of an insurance contract. The health insurance policy underlying the suit became effective on August 1,
1969, but provided an exemption of coverage for illness occurring within the 270 days preceding the effective date.
Ledingham had established a routine of having gynecological
examinations every six months, and in fact had such an examination approximately one month before seeking medical insurance. The test results were negative, but on August 3, 1969, the
plaintiff suffered the onset of a series of episodes culminating in
a hysterectomy on November 25, 1969. The defendant insurer refused coverage under the 270-day exemption clause, asserting
that the severity of the illness indicated it could not have developed during the two days the policy was in force. There was no
evidence indicating bad faith on the insurer's part.4 Nonetheless, a jury reached a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and
awarded her damages in the amount of $9,200, a sum that included punitive damages.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the award of punitive
damages for wilful and wanton misconduct constituted reversible error because the action was brought on the contract; to the
extent that the award included punitive damages, it was in violation of the general prohibition against punitive damages in con3. 2911. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 64 l1.
2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75 (1976).
4. Plaintiff filed suit in three counts: Count I, for wilful and wanton
conduct, sought actual and punitive damages; Count H alleged negligence
and sought compensatory damages; Count HI sought compensatory damages for breach of contract. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Count U during
the trial and judgment on Counts I and MrI
was entered on a general verdict
for $9,200.00 plus costs. Id. at 341, 330 N.E.2d at 542.
The appellate court found that the evidence presented at trial supported compensatory damages of $1,592.85. The balance constituted punitive damages. Id. at 351-52, 330 N.E.2d at 549.
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tract actions. 5 The plaintiff argued that the action sounded in
tort, notwithstanding the contractual relationship of the
6
parties.
The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District first examined the 1883 supreme court case of Nevin v. Pullman Palace
Car Company,7 in which the plaintiff was allowed an extra-contractual recovery because a recovery on the contract would have
been limited to the price of his railway tickets, which the Nevin
court deemed inadequate. 8 The Ledingham court interpreted
Nevin to be authority for the proposition that a tort action can
arise from conduct which also constitutes breach of contract. 9
After examining other relevant authority, 10 the court found that
in Illinois: 1) punitive damages may not generally be awarded
in an action on the contract; 2) the breach of a contract may itself constitute an unusual case where an independent wilful tort
will be found; 3) in the life and health insurer-insured relationship there is a duty upon both parties to act in good faith and
deal fairly with the other party to the contract; and 4) breach of
this duty implied by law is both a breach of the contract and a
tort."
The court observed that while this tortious conduct could
give rise to an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Illinois precludes recovery of punitive damages on this
theory. 12 The court stated, however, that
threatened and actual bad faith refusals to make payments under
the policy, maliciously employed by defendants in concert with
false and threatening communications directed to the policyholder
for the purpose of causing him to surrender his policy or disadvantageously settle a nonexistent dispute constitutes a tortious interference with a protected property interest of its insured for which
damages may be recovered.
Punitive damages may properly be
13
awarded in such a case.
In the case at bar the court found that the defendant had
drawn reasonable inferences from the medical facts and had in5. Id. at 342, 330 N.E.2d at 543.
6. Id. at 344, 330 N.E.2d at 544.
7. 106 Ill. 222 (1883).
8. Id. at 231-33. Due to special relationships between contracting parties the law imposes implied duties, Id. at 233.
9. 29 Ill. App. 3d at 344, 330 N.E.2d at 544.
10. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973); Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d
376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); Knierem v. Izzo, 22 111. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157
(1961); Krutsinger v. Illinois Casualty Co., 10 111. 2d 518, 141 N.E.2d 16 (1957).
See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 538 (1954).
11. 29 Ill. App. 3d at 350, 330 N.E.2d at 548.
12. Id. at 350-51, 330 N.E.2d at 548-49.
13. Id. at 351, 330 N.E.2d at 549.
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voked the exemption clause in good faith.1 4 The compensatory
damages award was proper because it had been determined at
15
trial that the defendant had erroneously denied benefits.
Thus, the court reversed the judgment to the extent of the punitive damages awarded because the facts did not demonstrate a
bad faith attempt to use the plaintiffs plight as a lever to force a
disadvantageous settlement.
The Third District confronted a suit seeking extra-contractual damages in Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha.16 The plaintiff had
purchased a disability income policy from the defendant on May
20, 1970. Debolt became disabled under the terms of the policy
in December of 1973. His disability payments fell in arrears and,
when a substantial amount was due and owing, the defendant
offered to repurchase the policy at an amount well below the
policy reserve. Debolt brought suit alleging intentional infliction
of emotional distress and breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing, and sought punitive damages.' 7 The trial court dismissed the complaint and the plaintiff appealed. 18
The appellate court scrutinized the complaint, concluding:
"[W]e find that it is fraught with conclusions of fact unsupported by allegations of specific facts, i.e., that defendant instilled in plaintiff a fear for his life and that defendant instituted
a policy designed to coerce the plaintiff into surrendering his.
policy."'19 Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed
to allege specific facts which demonstrated outrageous conduct
by the defendant, and held the emotional distress count to have
20
been properly dismissed.
The court next addressed the count seeking punitive damages for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. It
stated, "We have carefully examined the case of Ledingham,
and... do not feel constrained to accept the result reached as
being precedential in the instant case .... -21 The court discussed the authorities relied on in L'edingham,22 noting that
Nevin was inapposite because the defendant there was a common carrier and therefore subject to a higher standard of care in
14. Id. at 352, 330 N.E.2d at 549.
15. Id.
16. 56 Ill.
App. 3d 111, 371 N.E.2d 373 (1978).
17. Id. at 112, 371 N.E.2d at 374-75. Plaintiff brought suit in three counts.
Count I, which plaintiff voluntarily dismissed, was for breach of contract.
That count was not involved in the appeal. Id. at 375.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 113, 371 N.E.2d at 375.

20. Id., 371 N.E.2d at 375-76.
21. Id. at 114, 371 N.E.2d at 376.
22. Id. at 114-15, 371 N.E.2d at 376-77.
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tort actions.23 The court also distinguished from the facts before
it the duty-to-settle cases, wherein an insurer wrongfully refuses to settle within policy limits, thereby exposing the insured
to liability for a judgment beyond policy limits. The court focused on the fact that in those cases breach of the duty led to
monetary damages to the insured which could not be recovered
in an action on the contract. 24 In contrast, Debolt could have
sued on the contract to recover any benefits due. 25 Finally, the
court criticized Ledingham's reliance on several California decisions allowing punitive damages for breach of the duty of good
26
faith and fair dealing.
The court then turned to a discussion of section 15527 of the
Insurance Code of Iflinois. 28 This section, headed "Attorney's
Fees", permitted the insured to recover the lesser of twenty-five
percent of the plaintiffs recovery or $1,000, provided the court
first finds the insurer's refusal to pay to be "vexatious and without reasonable cause. ' 29 The Third District interpreted this section to evidence a legislative intent to provide a remedy to an
23. Id. 371 N.E.2d at 376.
24. Id. at 115, 371 N.E.2d at 377. See Cernocky v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 69
Ill. App. 2d 196, 216 N.E.2d 198 (1966).
25. 56 I1. App. 3d at 115, 371 N.E.2d at 377. This facile argument does not
stand up to close consideration. The implication is that the plaintiff has
somehow contributed to his injury by not instituting suit on the policy earlier. To say that a plaintiff could have instituted an action at any time upon
the contract ignores that the defendant who wrongfully forces a party to
resort to litigation is in fact using the reality of the time-consuming modem
litigation process to coerce that party into a possibly disadvantageous settlement. Indeed, being forced into litigation only tends to heighten the severity of the plaintiff's plight. Moreover, in the duty-to-settle cases extracontractual injury is the basis of extra-contractual recovery. Thus, the distinction is dubious. The obligation of the insurer to pay benefits is not tantamount to a right to inflict injury simply because the obligation will
provide money to the injured party.
Further, when has the plaintiff's cause of action ripened? The insurance company must be allowed reasonable time to conduct reasonable investigation when there is a genuine question of liability. At what point has
the insurer breached under these circumstances? Prematurely filing an action will not help a plaintiff in distress. Given the length of time it can take
to move a case through the court system, starting a contract action to obtain
benefits due under a disability income policy may assure adequate recovery, but timely recovery to avert further harm is unlikely. The plaintiff suffers injuries patently compensible in tort law should they arise under a
recognized theory of recovery.
26. Id. at 115-16, 371 N.E.2d at 377. See cases cited supra note 11.
27. Section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code of 1937 is the predecessor
of the current § 767. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1981). Throughout the
case law in this area references to sections 155 and 767 are made interchangeably. For all practical purposes, they are snynonymous.
28. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1981).
29. Id. at § 767(1).
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insured encountering "unnecessary difficulties"; 30 that remedy
being the award of attorney's fees and costs under section 767.31
The practical effect of this holding was that in any insurance
contract action for an amount in excess of $4,000,32 the sole remedy of the insured for extra-contractual injuries suffered as a result of the breach, and the maximum punishment of the
33
breaching insurer, was the award of $1,000 in attorney's fees.
The Fourth District was the next to be presented with a
claim for extra-contractual damages for conduct in breach of an
insurance contract. In Urfer v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. ,34
the plaintiff sought $2,000 in hospital and medical costs and disability income provided under a "no fault" automobile insurance
30. Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha, 56 Ill. App. 3d 111, 116, 371 N.E.2d 373, 377
(1978). "Unnecessary difficulties" is a broad phrase encompassing a vast

range of behavior, including delays occasioned by activities which do not
rise to the level or character of those specified in Ledingham as being tortious. No attempt was made to distinguish the different forms of wrongful
conduct.
31. Id. at 117, 371 N.E.2d at 378. The court weakened its position on this
point by stating: "It may well be that the statutory remedy should provide
greater relief but we hold that to be a matter for legislative determination."
Id. at 117, 371 N.E.2d at 378.
The court attempted to bolster its position by citing Cunningham v.
Brown, 22 Ill. 2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153 (1961), an Illinois Supreme Court decision which refused to recognize an asserted common-law cause of action to
compliment recovery under the Dram Shop Act, IL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135
(1957). The Third District failed to appreciate, however, the distinction between an entire statutory scheme, such as the Dram Shop Act, which defines tortious conduct and the rights of its victims, and merely one section
of another statutory scheme, itself based on contractual relationships,
which regulates the rights of parties to such contracts. In the latter context,
§ 767 is more consonant with the entire statutory scheme where it is interpreted as statutory authority for the allowance of costs in an action on a
contract, rather than as a legislative attempt to limit tort liability of the
insurer.
32. This is true because § 767 provides for the allowance of the lowest
figure derived in one of three ways: (1) 25% of the amount in issue;
(2) $1,000; or, (3) the excess of the amount recovered over the amount the
insurer offered. Therefore, in an action for less than $4,000, the lowest
amount derived by the first or third method of calculation would be the
amount allowed. In an action where $4,000 or more is in issue, the $1,000
limit would be the lowest amount authorized by the section.
33. In rebutting Ledingham's reliance on California decisions, the Debolt court noted that California had no statute comparable to § 767, and,
therefore, punitive damages in that jurisdiction had not been pre-empted
by legislative act. 56 IM.App. 3d at 117, 371 N.E.2d at 378.
34. 60 Ill. App. 3d 469, 376 N.E.2d 1073 (1978). While this decision does
not reflect the Fourth District's present position on the question of tort liability and punitive damages against an insurer, it is included here because
of the role it played in subsequent decisions in other districts.
Urfer had been injured on September 19, 1972, in a collision with a
school bus. He filed suit against the school distict, accepted a $50,000 settlement, and then tendered medical reports to the defendant insurer on December 19, 1975; a full three years and three months after the occurrence.
Id. at 471, 376 N.E.2d at 1074.
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policy. The amended complaint sought to state a cause of action
35
on the principles and authorities enunciated in Ledingham.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and the appellate court
affirmed for failure of the pleadings to state facts rather than
conclusions of law. 36 The court took note of Debolt in dicta, but
37
expressly declined to address the issues raised in that case.
Justices Mills and Craven wrote separate opinions in Urfer
in direct opposition to one another. Justice Mills' opinion was
the first Illinois articulation of the concept of section 767 as "legislative pre-emption" of a tort action for compensatory and punitive damages in this context. 38 He would have followed the
Debolt reasoning, but stated: "Adequate remedy? Perhaps
not. ' 39 Like the Debolt court, he was troubled by this possibility, but would shift the responsibility for rectifying it to the legislature. 40 Justice Craven, on the other hand, found Ledingham
"clear authority for the proposition that there is a cause of action sounding in tort for a wilful and intentional refusal to pay a
'41
clear contractual obligation."
In 1979, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District
took up the question of extra-contractual damages for an insurer's bad faith breach of contract in Tobolt v. Allstate Insurance Co .42 After his home was substantially damaged by fire,
the plaintiff sought benefits under a fire loss policy the defendant had issued. When the defendant refused to pay the amounts
claimed, the plaintiff filed suit. The trial court dismissed the
claims seeking damages for intentional infliction of severe emo35. Id. Plaintiff first sought relief under Article XXXV of the Illinois
Insurance Code ("no-fault" insurance) and the provisions therein which allowed treble damages where the insurer's refusal was wilful. The first complaint was dismissed at defendant's suggestion that Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill.
2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972), which found the Illinois "no-fault" statute unconstitutional, precluded plaintiff's action. 60 Ill. App. 3d 469, 376 N.E.2d
1073 (1978). But cf. Pinson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 11. App. 3d 788, 386 N.E.2d
638 (1979) (contract between the parties could incorporate in its terms the
provisions of the no-fault statute, the unconstitutionality of that statute
notwithstanding).
36. 60 Ill. App. 3d at 473, 376 N.E.2d at 1076-77.
37. Id. at 475, 376 N.E.2d at 1077.
38. Id. (Mills, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
39. Id.
40. Id. Mills' separate opinion makes Urfer significant for two reasons.
First, it plays a role in the development of the First District's position in
Tobolt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 Ill. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (1979). See infra
notes 43-49 and accompanying text. Second, in Lynch v. Mid-America Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 94 Ill. App. 3d 21, 418 N.E.2d 421 (1981), the Fourth District
recognized the tort action underlying Justice Craven's dissent in Urfer
without one line of dissent from Justice Mills, thereby undermining the reasoning and strength of Tobolt.
41. 60 Ill. App. 3d at 476, 376 N.E.2d at 1078 (Craven, J., dissenting).
42. 75 Ill. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (1979).
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tional distress and punitive damages for the defendant's failure
to act in good faith. 43 The appellate court found the allegations
and the evidence in the record demonstrated merely the existence of a dispute concerning the amounts of adjustments and
benefits due. No facts were alleged demonstrating outrageous
conduct by Allstate. On the contrary, the court found that Allstate was "only insisting upon its legal rights in a permissible
way."4" Plaintiff thus failed to state a cause of action.
Having found an absence of outrageous conduct, it would
have been a simple matter to affirm the dismissal of the punitive
damages claim as baseless. However, the First District chose
not to do so. Instead, the court leapt into the fray, citing Debolt
and Urfer as authority for holding that section 767 had preempted a cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing.45 It quoted at length the separate opinion of "Mr.
Presiding Justice Mills" in Urfer.4 The court further supported
its finding noting that "[iun 1977 the legislature agreed that section 155 had pre-empted the field when it amended that section
to increase the recovery for vexatious delay. ' 47 The court declined to follow contrary language interpreting section 155 in
Eckenrode v. Life of America Insurance Co.4
In 1980, the Second District had an opportunity to decide a
claim for punitive damages based on an insurer's breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing in Hoffman v. Allstate Insurance Co. 49 Hoffman's car was damaged in an auto accident and
towed to a nearby service station. It was subsequently towed to
an undisclosed location. Eight days after the accident, one of
the defendant's adjusters advised the plaintiff that the car was
deemed a total loss and tendered a draft in full payment. Hoffman questioned certain deductions and ultimately returned the
check. He twice requested disclosure of the location of the auto
so he could have the wreck independently appraised, but he was
never given the location. Hoffman sued in five counts.5 0 The
trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss four of the
43. Id. at 58-68, 393 N.E.2d at 1172-78.
44. Id. at 66, 393 N.E.2d at 1177.
45. Id. at 68-70, 393 N.E.2d at 1179-80.
46. Id. at 70, 393 N.E.2d at 1180 (citing Urfer v. Country Mutual Ins. Co.,
60 Ill.
App. 3d 469, 376 N.E.2d 1073 (1978)).
47. 75 Ill. App. 3d at 70, 393 N.E.2d at 1180.
48. 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972). This federal decision interpreted and applied Illinois law prior to any of the decisions discussed in this article.
49. 85 I. App. 3d 631, 407 N.E.2d 156 (1980).
50. Id. at 632, 407 N.E.2d at 157-59.
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counts, including one which alleged breach of the fiduciary duty
51
and sought punitive damages.
In affirming the trial court's dismissal of this claim, the appellate court cited Tobolt, Urfer, and Debolt and held that section 767 pre-empted an award of punitive damages in these
circumstances.5 2 The court further stated:
However, paragraph 767, on its face, does not preempt a plaintiffs
right to claim compensatory damages for a breach of good faith and
fair dealing. An examination of plaintiffs Count IV reveals that it
alleges spurious deductions, failure to allow for salvage value, and
refusal to reveal the location of the vehicle, and that these acts
were willful breaches of the defendants' fiduciary duties. In our
view these allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, and as to 53
compensatory damages, Count IV should be remanded for trial.
Thus, the Second District carved a middle position between
Ledingham and Tobolt. In so doing, it allowed recovery of damages in tort, thereby implicitly recognizing the existence of a tort
cause of action in the conduct of the insurer.
The Fourth District in 1981 finally came fully to grips with
the issue of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and
the availability of extra-contractual damages for such conduct,
in Lynch v. Mid-America Fire and Marine Insurance Co.54 The
plaintiffs in Lynch were partners in a business which the defendant insured against fire loss. On September 4, 1973, fire
damaged the plaintiffs' building and stock of inventory. The
next day, the defendant's agent visited the site, instructed the
plaintiffs to prepare and submit a list of all items lost, and instructed them to lock the building. The plaintiffs followed the
instructions. About six weeks later, however, Mid-America re55
fused to pay the claim and the plaintiffs sued.
Count I of the complaint alleged breach of contract and
sought policy benefits plus attorney's fees under section 767 for
unreasonable and vexations refusal to pay benefits.5 6 Count II
sought compensatory and punitive damages for the defendant's
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in handling the
plaintiffs' claim.5 7 The plaintiffs prevailed in a jury trial and the
court entered judgments for $39,314.11 on Count I and for
$150,000.00 in compensatory damages and $100,000.00 in punitive
damages on Count ]1,58 from which Mid-America appealed.

51. Id. at 632, 407 N.E.2d at 157.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 634-35, 407 N.E.2d at 159.
Id.
94 Ill. App. 3d 21, 418 N.E.2d 421 (1981).
Id. at 22, 418 N.E.2d at 423.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23, 418 N.E.2d at 423.
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The appellate court affirmed the judgment on Count I and
on Count II as to liability for compensatory damages, 59 but remanded Count H for a new trial on the amount of such damages. 60 The award of punitive damages was reversed. 61 MidAmerica had argued that Count H failed to state a recognized
common-law cause of action, 62 but the Lynch court rejected this
argument, finding that such a tort action did exist in Illinois
based on Ledingham, Debolt, Tobolt, Urfer, and Hoffman. 63 The
court refused to recognize the pre-emption of such a tort action
by section 767 of the Insurance Code as it existed at the time the
cause of action arose. 64 The court noted that it is improper for a
court to tax attorney's fees as costs and award them to an adversary in an action on a contract, absent statutory authority to do
so. 65 This, the court indicated, is precisely what the original section 767 was intended to be: statutory authorization to allow taxation of attorney's fees as costs in an action on an insurance
contract. 66 'The tenor of the section gives no indication that it
was intended to cover the field of awarding compensation for
bad faith or vexatious dealing by insurers. '67 The Fourth District addressed the First District's assertion in Tobolt that the
1977 amendments to section 767 constituted legislative ratification of the pre-emption interpretation. Citing the doctrine that
legislative amendments expressly granting a power constitute a
legislative acknowledgment that the power was previously lacking,68 the court found that the 1977 amendments bolstered its
holding that, prior to 1977, a tort cause of action existed for outrageous conduct by an insurer.6 9 Finally, the court noted that in
1978 the Illinois Supreme Court had cited Ledingham for the
proposition that a separate tort cause of action may arise from
59. Id. at 31, 418 N.E.2d at 429.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 29-31, 418 N.E.2d at 428-29.
62. Id. at 23, 418 N.E.2d at 423.
63. Id. at 23-25, 418 N.E.2d at 424-25.
64. Id. at 25-26, 418 N.E.2d at 425. But cf. 20 Am. JuR. 2D Costs § 7 (1965),
indicating that the law in effect at the time of judgment rather than at the
time of the occurrence or when the action commenced governs what is allowable as costs. By this rule, the decision rendered in 1980 should not have
been governed by pre-1977 § 767.
65. 94 MI1.
App. 3d at 25-26, 418 N.E.2d at 425.
66. Id.
67. Id. The court expressly declined to address whether the post-1977
version of § 767 pre-empts the field of tort liability and left open the question of the validity of the pre-emption interpretation. Thus, the question
arises: should this grant-of-authority interpretation be extended to the present § 767?
68. Id. See People ex rel. Scott v. Cardet Int'l Inc., 24 MII.App. 3d 740,
746-47, 321 N.E.2d 386, 392 (1974).
69. 94 Ill. App. 3d at 25-26, 418 N.E.2d at 425.
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conduct which also constitutes breach of contract.70 The Lynch
court distinguished bad faith acts from outrageous conduct by
an insurer and addressed only the former. Thus, the tort action
it recognized as having existed prior to the 1977 amendments to
section 767 arises when something less than outrageous conduct
71
has occurred.
Justice Craven ified a separate opinion in Lynch, concurring
in the majority's decision in all respects except the reversal of
the award of punitive damages. 72 In Craven's view, the evidence
on the issue was "close", and he felt that the appellate court
should defer to the determination of the trial court and the jury.
After presenting the standards for the award of punitive damages in Illinois and applying them to the facts of the case, he
73
concluded that the award was proper.
Robertson v. Travelers Insurance Company,74 the most recent case in this area, presented the Fifth District with an oppor70. Id. at 26, 418 N.E.2d at 426. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IM.2d 172,
187, 334 N.E.2d 353, 360 (1978).
71. Defendant Mid-America had pled the affirmative defense of other
insurance coverage. This assertion proved unfounded and the Fourth District felt this bore on Mid-America's good faith. 94 Ill.
App. 3d at 28, 418
N.E.2d at 427.
72. Id. at 31-33, 418 N.E.2d at 429-30 (Craven, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
73. Id. See Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1977) (punitive
damages not necessarily awarded in every case of reckless or intentional
tort); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IMI.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (punitive
damages intended to punish and deter); Mattyasovsky v. West Towns Bus
Co., 61 IMI.2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1975) (recovery allowed for fraud, actual
malice, or wilful and wanton conduct); O'Brien v. State Street Bank &Trust
Co., 82 IIl. App. 3d 83, 401 N.E.2d 1356 (1980) (defendant's conduct must go
beyond that which is the basis of the action to support punitive damages);
Galayda v. Penman, 80 111. App. 3d 423, 399 N.E.2d 656 (1980) (punitive damages not allowed for mere negligence); Shaw v. Miller, 64 mll.
App. 3d 743, 381
N.E.2d 985 (1978) (punitive damages award should be reversed only if abuse
of discretion is shown); Glass v. Burkett, 64 Ill. App. 3d 676, 381 N.E.2d 821
(1978) (punitive damages are not favored); Delano v. Collins, 49 IIl. App. 3d
791, 364 N.E.2d 716 (1977) (whether punitive damages are appropriate is a
question of law; the amount is a fact question).
74. 100 Ill. App. 3d 845, 427 N.E.2d 302 (1981) rev'd, 95 M11.2d 411, 448
N.E.2d 866 (1983). The Illinois Supreme Court's reversal in Robertson does
not, however, undermine the logic of the principles advanced in this article
because the court does not address the lower court's treatment of § 767.
The reversal is based on § 5(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (1973)
(exclusive remedy provision), § 19(k), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19(k)
(1973) (penalty provision based on unreasonable or "vexatious" delay) and
the court's determination that the "essence" of Robertson's complaint was
"delay." 95 Ill. 2d at 441, 448 N.E.2d at 866. The supreme court stated that
the appellate court used too narrow of a standard when it applied § 5(a).
Id. at 446, 448 N.E.2d at 869. The court's position is bolstered by its determination that § 19(k), while applicable in ordinary cases ofynjustiflable delay,
is no less applicable in cases involving malicious delay. The court refers to
"vexatious" (as used in § 19(k)) as meaning intended to harass. Id. at 447,
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448 N.E.2d at 869. An intent to harass, however, is not the same as an intent
to injure; the latter is the essence of malicious conduct.
Furthermore, in a somewhat ambiguous statement, the supreme court
appears to assert that the remedies provided by the Act extend to injuries
beyond its scope. The court stated: "A common law action should not,
without other evidence of legislative intent, be held to survive the Act's exclusivity provisions merely because the remedy provided in the Act for the
injury alleged applies to other kinds of injuries as well." Id. at 447, 448
N.E.2d at 869. The author believes that this is a dubious position at best.
Section 5(a) applies to "injury . . . sustained while in the line of...
duty as [an] employee." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (1973). This has
been interpreted as requiring the injury to arise out of and in the course of
employment. Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329, 330-31 (1st Cir. 1974).
The phrase "arising out of" has repeatedly been interpreted by the supreme
court as referring to the causal connection between the injury and the employment. Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Industrial Comm., 45 Ill. 2d 203, 258
N.E.2d 354 (1970). The position taken by the supreme court presumes such
a relationship. It cannot be said, however, that the employment caused the
insurer's independent malicious act. The phrase "in the course of employment" has been interpreted to refer to the time, place, and circumstances of
the injury. Id. The injury inflicted by malicious delay does not occur at the
work place while the employee is on the job. Indeed, the employee is unable to work at the time the injury is sustained. It is difficult at best to see
how such an injury could be "sustained while in the line of duty as an employee." Therefore, the injury does not occur in the course of employment
and is not within the scope of injuries compensable under the Act.
In addition, § 5(a) should not be interpreted as precluding a tort action
resulting from an insurer's dilatory tactics. The court expressed no view,
however, "as to whether a plaintiff in a case such as Unruh [Unruh v. Truck
Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063 (1972) (defendant's investigators kept
claimant under surveillance and displayed films of her at worker's compensation hearing thereby causing emotional distress) I may claim in tort for
emotional distress resulting from outrageous activity apart from delay." 95
Ill. 2d at 450, 448 N.E.2d at 871. The supreme court therefore reasoned that a
tort action for delay is preempted by the Worker's Compensation Act. Not
all tort liability, however, is so preempted. Section 5(a) should not preclude a tort action based upon delay because the penalties provided for by
§ 19(k) are intended to deter dilatory tactics by an insurer. The trigger language in § 19(k) goes to delay in proper payment of compensation benefits
due. The fact that delay is one tactic used to coerce a compensation plaintiff should not preclude recovery for injuries suffered through the malicious
use of such delay as well as the injuries sustained by virtue of other aspects
of the defendant's conduct. To hold otherwise is to limit the liability of an
insurer for the consequences of his delay and, in extreme cases, invite such
delay as a means of limiting such liability. There is no indication, however,
that the penalties provided for by § 19(k) are in fact compensation for injuries resulting from such tactics. Such injuries do not arise out of or in the
course of employment and therefore fall beyond the scope of the Act. It
follows that § 5(a) should not preclude a tort action for such injuries.
Two other recent decisions are worthy of consideration. The first is
Kelly v. Stratton, 552 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Ill. 1982), where the court held that
§ 767 does not preempt an action in tort for the bad faith conduct of an insurer. Id. at 648. Although this decision reaches the same conclusion as
this article, it does so by different reasoning.
The court noted the same progression of cases discussed by this author
in establishing the divergent appellate district positions and that the Illinois Supreme Court had not, at that time, addressed the issue. Defining the
issue as one of statutory construction, the court noted that there are several

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 16:471

Robertson had been employed by Kaskaskia Constructors, for
reasonable constructions. The first is the Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha, 56 InI.
App. 3d 111, 371 N.E.2d 373 (1978) and Tobolt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 M. App.
3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (1979) approach which construes the statute as placing a duty on the insurer to not refuse or unreasonably delay paying benefits due and limiting recovery for breach of this duty. These two cases
reason, therefore, that the legislature has manifested a policy of limiting
insurer liability so that tort liability is precluded. Stratton, 522 F.Supp. at
645-46. The second construction recognizes a statutory penalty in addition
to the contract recovery. Tort liability is not preempted, however, because
the statutory language refers to the amount the insured is "entitled to recover" and this language does not preclude tort recovery. Therefore, the
statute does not address the availability of tort recovery. Id. at 646. The
third construction is that set out in Hoffman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 85 Ill. App.
3d 631, 407 N.E.2d 156 (1980); the statutory language refers to a penalty
which is punitive in nature and, therefore, punitive damages are preempted. Compensatory damages for a bad faith breach of contract, however, are not preempted. Stratton, 522 F. Supp. at 645-46.
Applying the rules used by Illinois courts in construing statutes, the
federal court reviewed the legislative history. Id. at 647. That history
makes reference to the Insurance Laws Study Commission. The report of
that Commission states, in part:
The Commission thought the insurance industry might have taken the
opportunity to utilize Senate Bill 517 to establish statutory limits on the
amount of punitive damages. This was not done. Perhaps this disinterest reflects the disquietude which the Illinois Supreme Court has had
with regard to whether punitive damages may be constitutional.
Id. at 648 (quoting the Illinois Insurance Laws Study Commission, Final
Report to the Governor and 80th General Assembly 18-19 (1977)). On this
basis the federal court stated;
IW] e conclude that the purpose of § 767, as amended in 1977, was to aid
plaintiffs by establishing a right to a limited recovery of a liquidated
sum if they can make the minimal showing that the insurance company
acted vexatiously and unreasonably. It does not limit the right of such
plaintiffs to prove that the insurance company's actions violated an independent duty in tort and to recover all damages allowed by the common law as a result of the tort.
Id.

Noting that Debolt, Tobolt, and Hoffman had not considered the legislative history, the federal court found that the Illinois Supreme Court, if faced
with the issue, would decide that § 767 does not limit the right of the insured
to pursue an action in tort for the bad faith of an insurer. Id. When this
decision is read in conjunction with the body of this paper, it becomes apparent that there are substantial reasons for holding that § 767 does not preempt tort liability.
The second decision is Perschall v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 113 M.
App. 3d 233, 446 N.E.2d 570 (1983). It is interesting to note that Justice Mills,
see supra note 41, began this decision with the following observation: "Disability Insurance Claim. 'Vexatious' delay in benefits? The trial court so
held. We affirm." Id. at 235, 446 N.E.2d at 571. The decision refers to the
trial court award (based on plaintiffs post trial motion) as "punitive damages." Neither party presented any evidence to support their views although the court held a hearing on the motion thus affording them the
opportunity. The award was therefore based on the evidence adduced at
trial and the arguments heard on the motion. Id. at 238, 446 N.E.2d at 574.
The defendant insurance company argued that the question of vexatious
delay should be put to the jury. The trial court, however, held that the statute provides for judicial resolution of this issue. Id. at 238-39, 446 N.E.2d at
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whom Travelers provided workers' compensation coverage. On
June 25, 1971, Robertson fell while at work and injured at least
one and, allegedly both, knees. Travelers paid most of his immediate medical expenses. One payment was sent on March 22,
1972, and was received by Robertson on March 30, 1972. 75 The
Workers' Compensation Act 76 then in effect required any claim
for adjustment to be ified with the Industrial Commission within
one year of receipt of the last compensation payment.
On March 13, 1973, Robertson informed Travelers that he
would undergo surgery on both knees in April of 1973. He was
told that he could put Travelers' name on the hospital bill.
There was a dispute as to whether he was told that a final decision concerning the coverage of the surgery had not yet been
made.77 In-house memoranda of the company demonstrated
that it was operating under the mistaken belief that the one year
limitation for filing a workers' compensation claim would run on
March 22, 1973, one year from the date the final compensation
payment was sent. No effort was made to inform Robertson of
the statute until after that date. On March 20, 1973, an agent of
Travelers interviewed Robertson at length; he did not remind
Robertson of the statute of limitations, but did ask whether Robertson had retained counsel or ified a claim for adjustment.
Robertson stated that he had done neither. On March 29, 1973,
the agent wrote to Robertson advising him that the company believed that the complaints requiring bilateral knee surgery were
unrelated to his on-job injury and refused coverage for the surgery. Robertson received the letter on April 2, 1973, consulted an
attorney, and fied his claim with the Industrial Commission the
same day. Nine days later a memo was written to Travelers' file
which noted the running of the statute and described Travelers'
'78
position as being "home free.
Travelers raised the statute of limitations defense before
the Industrial Commission. 79 The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately decided the issue and held that Travelers was estopped
from asserting the defense because Robertson had refrained
from filing a compensation claim in reliance on Travelers' repre574. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion and therefore affirmed the decision. Id. at 240, 446 N.E. 2d at 575.
75. 100 IMI.
App. 3d at 846, 427 N.E.2d 304-05.
76. See Iii. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.6(c) (3), 138.8(a) (1969).
77. 100 III. App. 3d at 846-47, 427 N.E.2d at 305, rev'd, 95 Ill.
2d 441, 448
N.E.2d 866 (1983).
78. 100 Ill.
App. 3d at 848, 427 N.E.2d at 306, rev'd, 95 M11.
2d 441,448 N.E.2d
866 (1983).
79. Id.
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sentation.80 Only then, in 1975, did the company pay the plaintiff's claim, with interest.
Robertson was recovering from surgery on both knees during the pendancy of this action and was unable to work. He borrowed from relatives, went on public aid, and accepted charity
from the volunteer fire department to which he belonged. Robertson sued Travelers alleging that it had committed the tort 8of1
"outrage", thereby subjecting him to severe mental anguish.
The jury found for Robertson, awarding him $150,00082in compensatory damages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages.
Travelers argued on appeal that Robertson's cause of action
was pre-empted by section 767.83 The Fifth District rejected this

argument, noting that, on its face, section 767 applies to insurers
and insureds. Robertson was a third-party beneficiary to the intheresurance contract between Travelers and his employer;
84
fore, section 767 could not apply to his cause of action.
Travelers next argued that a provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, which provides a penalty for unreasonable or
vexatious delay in paying a claim, precluded the plaintiff's action.8 5 The court held this section to be inapplicable, reasoning
that the section applied even absent an intent to injure the
payee. Robertson had alleged an intent to injure, and8 6 Travelers
had refused payment rather than merely denying it.
The Fifth District then addressed the tort of outrage as applied to the insurance industry in Illinois. The court recognized
two separate and distinct theories of recovery for outrageous
conduct. The first, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
will lie where the insurer's actions are both outrageous and in
bad faith. It will support the recovery of compensatory damages. 87 The second, characterized by the insurer's threatened

and actual bad faith refusals to pay benefits due, accompanied
by false and threatening communications intended to coerce the
80. See Kaskaskia Constructors v. Industrial Comm'n, 61 1l1. 2d 532, 535,
337 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1975).
81. 100111. App. 3d at 848, 427 N.E.2d at 306, rev'd, 95 L.2d 441,448 N.E.2d
866 (1983).
82. 100 111. App. 3d at 846, 427 N.E.2d at 304, rev'd, 95 111. 2d 441, 448 N.E.2d

866 (1983).

83. 100 111. App. 3d at 848, 427 N.E.2d at 306, rev'd, 95 111. 2d 441, 448 N.E.2d

866 (1983).

84. Id.
85. 100 III. App. 3d at 850, 427 N.E.2d at 307, rev'd, 95 m. 2d 441,448 N.E.2d
866 (1983). See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19(k) (1979).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 851-52, 427 N.E.2d at 308-09, rev'd, 95 Ill. 2d 441, 448 N.E.2d 866
(1983), (citing Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.
1972)).
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insured into surrendering his policy or settling disadvantageously, may be sufficient to support the award of punitive
damages. 88
The court analogized Robertson's case to Eckenrode v. Life
of American Insurance Company,89 where the the defendant
had used the plaintiff's plight to apply "economic coercion" to
force a compromise when no valid defense to payment of the
claim existed.9° Noting that Robertson had suffered comparable
injury and that "[i]n some respects, the deviousness of Travelers employees renders their actions even more reprehensible," 9 1
the court found Travelers' conduct "significantly more outrageous" than the insurer's conduct in Ledingham, Debolt, and
Tobolt. 92 Thus, a cause of action in tort for outrageous conduct
was stated under the first theory which the court had defined.
The court next turned to Knierim v. Izzo,93 where the Illinois Supreme Court first recognized a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The supreme court there
stated: "[slince the outrageous quality of the defendant's conduct forms the basis of the action, the rendition of compensatory
damages will be sufficiently punitive."''
Finding Robertson's
suit to be one brought on this theory, the Fifth District reversed
the award of punitive damages as contrary to the law of Illinois.9 5 The case was remanded for a new trial on the issue of
96
compensatory damages in light of the Knierim rationale.
It is apparent from the foregoing decisions, that some disagreement exists among the appellate districts as to the nature of
the tort action available, the relationship of section 767 to such a
tort, and the availability of punitive damages resulting from the
conduct at issue. The First District holds that section 767 pre88. 100 Ill. App. 3d at 851,427 N.E.2d at 308, rev'd, 95 IIl. 2d 441,448 N.E.2d

866 (1983), (citing Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan, 29 l. App. 3d 339, 330
N.E.2d 540 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 64 IlM. 2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75 (1976)).
89. 420 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972).
90. Id. at 4-5. The Eckenrode court did not observe the distinction be-

tween reckless actions of an insurer, leading to liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious behavior leading to liability for
outrageous conduct, including. punitive damages. Thus, while confronted
with conduct fitting into the malicious category, the court classified it as
intentional infliction of emotional distress and found liability attaching
under Illinois law. Id. at 1.
91. 100111. App. 3d at 853,427 N.E.2d at 309, rev'd, 95 m. 2d 441,448 N.E.2d
866 (1983).

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961).
Id.at 88, 174 N.E.2d at 165.
Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 845, 853, 427 N.E.2d

302, 310 (1981), rev'd, 95 M11.
2d 441, 448 N.E.2d 866 (1983).
96. 100 mll. App. 3d at 854,427 N.E.2d at 310, rev'd, 95 111. 2d 441,448 N.E.2d

866 (1983).
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empts the field of tort liability for breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing in the insurance contract, as well as punitive damages for bad faith acts and vexatious conduct. The Second District has taken the position that section 767 pre-empts
the award of punitive damages for breach of the duty, but it does
not pre-empt a tort cause of action seeking compensatory
damages.
The Third District's position is unclear. In Debolt the court
declined to recognize a tort claim for breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing, stating that it did not feel constrained to
follow Ledingham, given the facts before it. The situation in Debolt was precisely and adequately addressed by section 767;
therefore, section 767 was the proper remedy. The court did not
directly address whether an action would lie for breach of the
duty where compensatory damages are sought, but it did hold
that section 767 pre-empts an action for punitive damages based
on such a breach. The court described section 767 as a legislatively-provided remedy for an insured encountering "unnecessary difficulties," but it made no effort to define this phrase or
the scope of conduct it embraces. As of this writing, the Third
District has not been faced with a suit seeking compensatory
damages for the breach. The tenor of Debolt indicates that the
court would not recognize such an action.
The Fourth District recognizes a tort cause of action for
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing based on its
interpretation of section 767, as it existed prior to the 1977
amendments. It interprets section 767 as statutory authority for
the allowance of attorney's fees as taxable costs in an action on
an insurance contract. It has not expressed an opinion on what
effect, if any, the 1977 amendments have on this interpretation.
The Fourth District overturned an award of punitive damages
for bad faith acts in Lynch, based on the absence of any authority allowing such an award for bad faith alone. It did not address
the availability of punitive damages for outrageous conduct, but
it did distinguish between bad faith and outrageous conduct.
The Fifth District recognizes two distinct theories for recovery in tort arising from conduct constituting breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing. Both are based on outrageous
conduct. The first theory is the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. In Illinois, the award of punitive damages on
this theory is precluded. The second theory is confined to situations where the insurer makes malicious use of threatened or
actual bad faith refusals to pay benefits due, accompanied by
false or threatening communications designed to coerce surrender of the policy or a disadvantageous settlement of the claim by
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the insured. Punitive damages may properly be awarded in
such a case, although the Illinois appellate courts have yet to
affirm a punitive damage award in any case presented.
THE HIERARCHY OF WRONGFUL CONDUCT BY INSURERS:

A MODEL
Any interpretation of section 767 requires a determination
of the conduct it addresses. Thus, a preliminary consideration is
wrongful conduct generally. It is axiomatic that wrongful conduct is not per se tortious conduct. The cases considered above
demonstrate that there is, within the insurance context, a range
of conduct for which tort actions will lie. That range of conduct
falls within the upper level of what might be conceptualized as a
hierachy of wrongful conduct. At the base of that hierarchy are
tactics which might generally be described as improper claims
practices; 97 at the top of the hierarchy, and the most egregious of
the insurer's practices, would be outrageous conduct maliciously employed.
The second level in the above described hierarchy is unreasonable delay or vexatious litigation forced upon the insured to
collect benefits due under an insurance policy. This is not necessarily characterized by bad faith, although any delay occassioned by bad faith would seem unreasonable. Whether the
delay was unreasonable, or the litigation vexatious, is a factual
question which must be determined by the totality of the circumstances. 98 One example is litigation resulting from the insurer's refusal to use a correct standard of damages in arriving
at a settlement offer once the use of the wrong standard is
brought to the insurer's attention.99 Other examples include the
use of any dilatory tactics in settling claims, such as sending the
claim fie out of state for evaluation or "accidentally" losing a
ffle.1
The crux of such conduct is using delay to induce compromise of a claim. In such instances, liability is not denied, but
prompt payment is not forthcoming. Generally, there is an ascertainable degree of deliberateness in the insurer's conduct.
97. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 766.6 (1981).
98. Fassola v. Montgomery Ward Ins. Co., 104 Ill. App. 3d 825, 433 N.E.2d
378 (1982). But note that § 767 is applicable whether the action is a bench
trial or jury triaL The statute, on its face, reserves the determination of un-

reasonable delay or vexatious litigation for the court, rather than the trier of

fact. Thus, even though a jury is present, the statute appears to make this
determination one of law rather than fact. See Ii. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767
(1981).

99. Fassola v. Montgomery Ward Ins. Co., 104 M11.
App. 3d 825, 833-34, 433
N.E.2d 378, 383 (1982).
100. See, e.g., Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha, 56 III. App. 3d 111, 371 N.E.2d
373 (1978).
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On the third level of the hierachy is conduct which goes beyond unreasonable conduct and which begins to be characterized by bad faith. The insurer breaches the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing as well as the general fiduciary duty owed
by an insurer to its insured. For such conduct, an action will lie
not only in contract but also in tort. The insurer has acted in
bad faith and has benefitted at the expense of the insured. Examples of this conduct include the use of spurious deductions to
arrive at a settlement offer, 0 1 the assertion of a defense to liability which could readily be determined to be unfounded, 10 2 and
the failure to take actions within its rights and power to mitigate
the amount of the insured's loss. 10 3 Robertson presented another example of this conduct.'0 There, the insurer knowingly
allowed the insured to rely on representations of coverage by its
agents until the insured's right of action under the Workers'
Compensation Act was barred by the statute of limitations. The
insurer denied coverage and asserted the statute as a defense.
The insurer litigated the issue all the way to the Supreme Court
of Illinois before paying any portion of the claim. Forcing the
insured to resort to litigation to collect benefits unquestionably
due constitutes a bad faith refusal to pay. It is palpably more
than litigation occassioned by an unreasonable delay, because
litigation is the only means by which benefits due may be obtained. This conduct may result in extra-contractual damages
resulting from the lack of insurance proceeds. Foreclosure of
mortgages and even bankruptcy can be foreseeable consequences of the refusal. The fact of such extra-contractual damages militates for an extra-contractual recovery. Thus, the
breach of contract notwithstanding, tort liability may properly
be imposed for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing.
The fourth level of the hierarchy is reached when the circumstances of the insured render him particularly dependant
on prompt payment of the policy proceeds and those circumstances are or should be known to the insurer. 0 5 At this point
the bad faith refusal to pay takes on an outrageous character,
101. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 85 l. App. 3d 631, 407 N.E.2d

156 (1980).
102. See, e.g., Lynch v. Mid-America Fire &Marine Ins. Co., 94 111. App. 3d
21, 418 N.E.2d 421 (1981).
103. Id.
104. Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 845, 427 N.E.2d 302
(1981), rev'd, 95 IMI. 2d 441, 448 N.E.2d 866 (1983). See supra notes 75-97 and
accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 100 ]l. App. 3d 845, 427
N.E.2d 302 (1981), rev'd, 95 Il. 2d 441, 448 N.E.2d 866 (1983). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comments c, e, f (1965).
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primarily because of the deliberate violation of the insurer's
fiduciary duty. When the insured's circumstances are known to
the insurer, the vriolation is reckless because those circumstances render the insured susceptible to severe emotional distress, and the insurer acts in a manner likely to inflict such
distress. Thus, where the circumstances combine with a bad
faith refusal to cause emotional distress, an action in tort on the
theory of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress will
on such a theory is limited
lie. 1° 6 In Illinois, however, recovery
x0 7
to compensatory damages.
The fifth and highest level of the hierarchy is encountered
where an insured in vulnerable circumstances is faced with actual or threatened bad faith refusals to pay, combined with false
or threatening communications designed to induce the insured
to surrender his policy or settle his case disadvantageously. In
this case, the insurer pursues a course of conduct that goes beyond recklessness. It is malicious behavior; the insurer deliberately acts to heighten the economic plight of the insured,
preying upon the very contingency the underlying contract was
designed to alleviate. This is not economic coercion in the sense
of two commercial entities dealing with one another at arm's
length. It is overbearing, unconscionable conduct combining elements of all the lower levels in the hierarchy, and borders on
fraud. As such, it is a proper instance for the award of punitive
damages.108

SECTION 767 OF THE INSURANCE CODE
The cases considered above demonstrate that the major
stumbling block to the imposition of tort liability upon insurers
is the interpretation which holds that section 767 constitutes legislative pre-emption of such liability. A proper interpretation of
section 767 requires consideration of the legislative history of
the section, the language of the section, and the hierarchy of
wrongful conduct presented above in order to determine the legislative purpose and scope of the section.
Legislative History
Section 767 originated as section 155 of the Illinois Insur(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comments c, e, f (1965).
107. Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Mli. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961).
108. See Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 100 1l1. App. 3d 845, 427 N.E.2d
302 (1981), rev'd, 95 111. 2d 441, 448 N.E.2d 866 (1983); Ledingham v. Blue
Cross Plan, 2911. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975), rev'd on other grounds,
64 Ill.
2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75 (1976).

106. See RESTATEMENT
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ance Code of 1937.109 Summarized, section 155 provided that,
upon the court's determination that the lawsuit before it was
vexatious, or the result of an unreasonable refusal to pay benefits due, the court could allow the prevailing party to collect reasonable attorney's fees. These fees would be a part of the
taxable costs of the action, over and above other costs of the action, and were subject to a maximum allowance of $500.00.110
The language of this section remained unchanged until 1967.
In that year two changes were made: section 767(1)(a) had
"25%" substituted for the phrase "twenty-five percentum"; and
section 767(1) (b) was amended, raising the ceiling on recovery
under the section from $500.00 to $1,000.00.111 The body of section 767 remained unchanged until 1977, when five changes were
made in the text of the section. These changes resulted in a substantial change in the operation of the section. To comprehend
these amendments, it is first necessary to understand the operation of the section prior to the 1977 amendments. The 1977
changes will then be presented and considered.
The Pre-1977 Section 767
In his 1937 law review article," 2 Harold C. Havinghurst,
Chairman of the committee of the Illinois State Bar Association
Insurance Law Section which drafted the basic version of the
Insurance Code as passed in 1937, addressed the purpose of section 155. He stated:
In the absence of any allowance of attorneys' fees, the holder of a
small policy may see practically his whole claim wiped out by expenses if the company compels him to resort to court action, although the refusal to pay the claim is based upon the flimsiest sort
of pretext. The strict limit on the amount allowable makes the section significant only for small claims. It should prove wholesome
in its effect upon
companies unreasonably withholding payment of
113
such claims.
Thus, the original section was intended to address an action
sounding in contract on a small insurance policy.
The general rule regarding costs holds that they are to be
born by the party incurring them, absent statutory authority to
the contrary. 114 Section 155 was meant to be such statutory au-

109. ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 73, § 767 (1937).

110. Id.
111. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1967).
112. Havinghurst, Some Aspects of the Illinois Insurance Code, 32 ILL. L
REV. 391 (1937).

113. Id. at 405 (emphasis added).
114. Galowich v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 92 Ill.
2d 157, 441 N.E.2d 318 (1982);
Murczek v. Powers Label Co., 31 Ill.
App. 3d 939, 335 N.E.2d 172 (1975).
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thority, specifically authorizing attorneys' fees, which would not
otherwise be part of the costs of the action. 115 The limitation of
the allowance to a $500.00 maximum 1 6 was the device by which
the legislature made the allowance most effective where the
amount of the claim was small, limiting by effect the scope of the
section.
Prior to the section's enactment, the expense of litigating a
claim on a small policy was a de facto disincentive to pursuing
such litigation."17 This gave rise to a concommitant incentive for
the insurer to force litigation upon its insured, or use the threat
of it abusively, where the claim was small. The effect of section
155 was to remove the disincentive and simultaneously create
an incentive for prompt payment of such claims." 8 The drafters
of the section saw its scope limited to contract actions on small
policies. Thus, the section presumes suit upon the contract.
Therefore, remedy for tortious conduct which also constitutes breach of contract falls beyond the scope of section 155.
Indeed, tort theories such as the intentional infliction of emotional distress were unknown at law when the section was enacted. 1 9 It follows that tort liability could not have been preempted by this section as it was never considered.
In the hierarchy of wrongful conduct presented above, the
type of conduct which triggers this section does not reach the
level at which tort liability arises. The "trigger language" addresses conduct which amounts to misuse of the litigation process by the insurer. This conduct is not tortious per se, but it
may give rise to a proper case for taxation of costs against the
insurer. 20 The taxation of costs is penal in nature but does not
constitute an award of punitive damages in a tort action, for tort
liability is not present. Costs are allowances generally in the nature of incidental damages, awarded by law to reimburse for ex12
penses necessarily incurred in asserting one's right in court. '
The 1967 amendments did nothing to change the substance
of the section. Therefore, this interpretation remained valid until the 1977 amendments took effect. The only significant change
made in 1967 was the increase of the amount allowable from
115. Lynch v. Mid-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 94
418 N.E.2d 421, 425 (1981).
116. See lI. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1937).

M. App. 3d 21, 25,

117. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
119. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was first recognized in Illinois in Knierim v. Izzo, 22 IM.2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961).
120. See 20 AM. JuR. 2D Costs (1965).
121. See Galowich v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 92 IMI. 2d 157, 441 N.E.2d 318

(1982).
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$1,000.00.122

The 1977 Amendments

The 1977 amendments to section 767 made a significant
change in the structure of the section. The amount of attorney's
fees allowable was removed from the statutory limits and made
subject to a standard of reasonableness. 23 The effect was to
broaden the scope of section 767 beyond small policy claims.

This is accomplished by removing the statutory "cap" on the
amount recoverable under the section. The section authorizes
the allowance of fees and other costs in any action where the
statutory criteria for such an allowance is met. It allows the
amount of the fees to be proportionate to the complexity of the
action. 124 However, the statute also provides for an award of a
deterrent, subject to a $5,000 maximum, as part of the taxable
costs of the action. 125 Attorney's fees allowed on a reasonable
basis would be proportionately smaller where the amount of the
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1967).
123. The specific amendments made in 1977 are set forth below. Language deleted by the amendments has been lined out. Language added to
the section is indicated in italics.
In any action by or against a company wherein there is in issue the
liability of a company on a policy or policies of insurance or the amount
of the loss payable thereunder, or for an unreasonabledelay in settling
a claim
,:oughpy h b
., sta,o ,. a c tLhe pl.y,o.r ,
e.
pay tle ,,out of the lo, and it appears to the court that such action
or delay sat-or1fusa is vexatious and unreasonable witho -rtoable-eause, the court may allow to th.e pwty wlio by the f Ifhlg of ti,e
cou~t ot jtny is entitlcJ to pievait against the~ comnparty, resnt

t

-

at-

,as part of the taxable costs in the action reasonable attor-

ney fees, other costs, plus an amount not to exceed any one of the
following amounts.

(a) 25% of the amount which the court or jury finds such party is
entitled to recover against the company, exclusive of all costs;
(b)
(c)

$ieee $5,000;
the excess of the amount which the court or jury finds such

party is entitled to recover, exclusive of costs, over the amount, if any,
which the company offered to pay in settlement of the claim prior to the
action.
(2) Where there are several policies insuring the same insured

against the same loss whether issued by the same or by different companies, the court may fix the amount of the allowance so that the total
attorney fees on account of one loss shall not be increased by reason of

the fact that the insured brings separate suits on such policies.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1977). See also Songer v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 106 Ill. App. 3d 141, 435 N.E.2d 948 (1982) (interpreting and
applying current § 767; upholding the allowance of $9,565.75 in attorney fees
as reasonable).
124. Id. The Songer decision presents a full discussion of the factors and
considerations relevant to making a determination of a reasonable amount
of attorney fees to be taxed against an insurer under § 767.
125. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1977). See supra note 124.
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claim was small. Without such a deterrent, the problem which
prompted enactment of the original section 155 could again crop
up; that is, a small policy holder could see substantially all of his
policy recovery consumed by fees and expenses. Therefore, the
legislature separated the allowance of attorney's fees from the
deterrent provision. The separate deterrent retains the same
structure as the original statute, and addresses the same circumstances as the original. Where the claim is small and the
litigation fairly simple, this deterrent provision is of greater significance than the allowance of attorney fees because the
amount of the fee will be less. Therefore, the provision will provide the deterrent effect of the original section 155. As the complexity of the legislation and the amount at stake increases, so
does the significance of the allowance of attorney fees, for these
fees are not limited by the $5,000.00 maximum on the
126
deterrent.
The modification of the first paragraph to allow reasonable
attorney's fees changed the mechanisms by which the section
operates. The scope of the section was broadened to the extent
that these mechanisms operate; that is, reasonable attorney's
fees can now be allowed in all actions on insurance policies, regardless of the amount, so long as the statutory criteria for applying section 767 are met. 127 The 'trigger" language, as with
the original section 155, also limits the scope of the section. Section 767 is still activated by wrongful conduct which does not
rise to the level of tortious conduct. Section 767, on its face, addresses actions where the issues are liability on a policy or the
amount of loss payable under a policy, or where the action is for
an unreasonable delay in settling a claim. 128 Liability under section 767 arises where the court determines that the action itself,
or the delay, is vexatious and unreasonable. That liability is for
taxable costs of the action. These costs have three distinct elements: (1) reasonable attorney fees; (2) other costs; and, (3) a
deterrent amount not to exceed $5,000.129 None of the issues addressed by the trigger language are tort issues. Like its predecessor, section 767 presupposes an action on the contract; there
is nothing in the section which addresses tortious conduct or
tort liability. It simply remains statutory authority for the allowance of costs, including attorney's fees, in an action at law on an
insurance contract.
126. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1977).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The exact amount of the penalty is determined in one of three
ways; the penalty should not exceed the lowest figure arrived at after determining the penalty by each of these methods. Id,
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The purpose served by the 1977 amendments is best demonstrated by considering the section in operation before and after
those amendments. The pre-1977 version was intended to operate most effectively in actions where the claim was small. 130 Its
allowance of attorney fees where the claim was more substantial
had very little significance. When fees were deemed available
under this section, they were limited to a maximum of $1,000,
regardless of the amount wrongfully withheld. 13 1 If that amount
was substantial and the litigation protracted, the insurer could
earn on the withheld proceeds an amount far in excess of the
penalty provided. Rather than a scourge for wrongful conduct,
section 767 could be used as a shield to avoid effective penalties.
The deterrent nature of the section could be completely
circumvented.
The present section discourages dilatory tactics and protracted litigation, regardless of the amount at issue. An insurer
who abuses the litigation process will increase the amount at
risk with each delay. The section has a deterrent tenor which
encourages prompt, fair, good faith settlement of all claims, and
132
serves the public policy underlying the entire code.
The legislative history of section 767, the language of the
section both before and after its amendments, and the type of
behavior which triggers its application militate one conclusion:
the section does not in any way address tortious conduct. In the
face of this conclusion, it is patently improper to hold this section has pre-empted tort liability for extra-contractual damages
arising from conduct which also constitutes a breach of contract.
This conclusion is consonant with the Illinois Supreme Court's
citation of the Ledingham decision for the proposition that tort
liability may arise from conduct constituting breach of
33
contract.
Moreover, this conclusion precludes the absurd result
which would be obtained if the pre-emption theory was adopted.
As demonstrated in Robertson, an insured party would be precluded from recovering tort damages from his insurer, while a
third-party beneficiary to the same insurance contract would
130. See Havinghurst, supra note 113, at 405.
131. See ILu- REv. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1967). See also Songer v. State

Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 106 1l1. App. 3d 141, 435 N.E.2d 948 (1982).

132. Regulation, control, and supervision of the industry is warranted by
the public interest with which it is imbued. People ex rel. Barber v. HarApp. 387, 388, 25 N.E.2d 416 (1940).
graves, 303 M11.
133. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). See
also cases cited supra note 74.
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not.134
Interpreted as statutory authority for the allowance of costs
in an action on the contract, including reasonable attorney fees,
section 767 is consonant with the statutory scheme of the entire
Insurance Code, which regulates insurance companies and the
contracts they enter. 135 If section 767 were interpreted as preempting any aspect of tort liability, it becomes the only section
of the Code to do so, and then only by judicial interpretation.
This is an incongruous result.
The conclusion that tort liability can arise in the proper setting leads to the conclusion that punitive damages may be available in a proper case. The deterrent provision in section 767 is
aimed at conduct which is detrimental to the public interest, but
which does not rise to the level of tortious conduct. Where tortious conduct is present, and other requirements for the award
of punitive damages are demonstrated, they should also be allowed. The two awards are based on different conduct, and
would be sought under different counts in the pleadings. There
is no basis for extending the scope of section 767 beyond the
type of conduct which the section addresses. That conduct does
not reach the threshold for consideration of punitive damages in
a tort action. Therefore, in a proper case, where the conduct of
the insurer is malicious and constitutes a tortious interference
with the proprietory interest of the insured in the proceeds of
the policy, the award of punitive damages should be allowed.
CONCLUSION

This article does not imply that tortious conduct by insurers
is commonplace in the affairs of the industry. As the cases
show, however, such conduct is not unknown. The fact that the
industry is imbued with a public interest is demonstrated by the
fact that in 1979, 191.8 billion dollars of life insurance coverage
alone was in force on the lives of Illinois residents. 136 That public interest requires strict protective scrutiny of the actions of
insurers. An interpretation of the law which tends to insulate
insurers from any form of liability for wrongful conduct is contrary to that public interest because it invites such wrongful
conduct to be committed with impunity.
134. See Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 845, 427 N.E.2d
302 (1981), rev'd, 95 Ill. 2d 441, 448 N.E.2d 866 (1983).
135. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 613 (1981). See also T.J. Fox v. Industrial
Casualty Ins. Co., 98 IM. App. 3d 543, 424 N.E.2d 839 (1981) (Insurance Code
does not provide exclusive private remedies for alleged wrongful conduct of
an insurer).
136. Alexander, Punitive Damages in Illinois Insurance Cases-Beyond
Ledingham, Debol4 and Kelsay, 70 ILL BJ. 645 (1982).
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When an insurer engages in conduct that inflicts extra-contractual injury on the insured, the insurer should be held accountable for that action. When the action rises to the level of
tortious conduct, tort liability should attach. When that conduct
warrants punitive damages, they should be available under the
established standards for their award.
The insurance industry is one which deals in risks. The predictable course of a particular insurer in given circumstances
will be that course which minimizes the insurer's risk. Thus, an
insurer is particularly susceptible to the deterrent effects of extra-contractual liability because engaging in conduct which exposes the insurer to such liability increases the insurer's risk.
The deterrent effect of the availability of punitive damages in an
appropriate case is that much greater as a consequence of the
insurer's interest in minimizing its risk. Therefore, the public
interest with which the industry is imbued is best served by the
availability of extra-contractual liability; and, in an appropriate
case, punitive damages.

